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that which is generally accepted by courts holding that the amount of paid-in
capital required by the incorporation statute is not conclusive of adequate
capitalization, but merely a prerequisite to legal recognition of the corpora- .
tion. However, this "minimum requirement" argument does not have the same
validity when applied to the New York mandatory-insurance statute. In the
latter case, the legislature has established a specific insurance figure for
the taxicab industry, not a general figure applicable to all corporations, as is
the paid-in capital figure.
The legislature must be deemed to have known that most cab operators
are incorporated for the purpose of preventing personal responsibility, and
the minimum-insurance statute must be regarded as a clear indication of
what the legislature thought was adequate protection for the public. Thus,
for the purposes of limited liability, a $10,000 insurance policy should be
considered an adequate asset to compensate tort claimants. The legislature's
intent to have it so is clear, especially when it is noted that the liability
insurance was increased from $5,000 to $10,000 in 1959, and that the statute
has been twice amended since then without further increases. It is extremely
difficult to say that the court would be protecting legislative policy by
judicially increasing the minimum amount of insurance needed by taxicabs.
The incorporators are not using the corporate form to defeat or avoid any
legislative policy, but are only taking advantage of a legitimate form of
organization. If the $10,000 figure set by the legislature is not sufficient, it
should be raised by the legislature.
ANDREW J. NEWMAN
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Section 9(b) (2)—Re-
quirements for Severance of Craft Workers.—Mallinckrodt Chem.
Works.'—Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, Uranium Division, Waldon Springs,
Missouri, was engaged in the manufacture of uranium metal and in the
purification of uranium ore under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with the
Atomic Energy Commission. Of its 560 employees, 280 were engaged in
production and maintenance, and were represented by the Independent Union
of Atomic Workers. Local 1 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers petitioned the National Labor Relations Board to sever twelve
instrument mechanics from the unit represented by the Atomic Workers.
The IBEW claimed to have been a traditional representative of the
type of craftsmen involved in the suit. Petitioner demanded severance on
the basis of the need for separate representation of the instrument mechanics
as a "functionally distinct and homogeneous traditional departmental
group."2 HELD: Petitioner does not qualify as a traditional representative
of instrument mechanics of the type involved in this case, nor does the record
indicate that the interests of the mechanics have been neglected by the
Atomic Workers. Although the instrument mechanics do constitute a group
of skilled journeymen mechanics,
1 162 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 64 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966).
2 Id., 64 L.R.R.M. at 1012.
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the separate community of interests which these employees enjoy
by reason of their skills and training has been largely submerged
in the broader community of interests which they share with other
employees by reason of long and uninterrupted association in the
existing bargaining unit, the high degree of integration of the em-
ployer's production processes, and the intimate connection of the
work of these employees with the actual uranium metal-making
process itself.°
In deciding this case, the Board considered many of its prior decisions as
well as the legislative history of Section 9(b) (2) of the Taft-Hartley Act'
One of the earliest cases which had a significant influence on the craft
worker was American Can Co. 5 The Board there held that it would not allow
craft severance if the industrial union could demonstrate, in a unit which
included the craft, a successful history of bargaining, together with adequate
representation of the interests of all members. To allow severance in such
situations, the Board felt, would only lead to internal turmoil in the industry:
"To permit such small groups to break up an appropriate unit established
and maintained by a bona fide collective bargaining contract against the
will of the majority of the employees who are bound by the contract would
make stability and responsibility in collective bargaining impossible."° The
Board concluded that it would look to "established custom and practice as
embodied in collective bargaining agreements for the appropriate units, and
not to theoretical principles that appeal to the members of the Board as be-
ing fair." 7 A strong dissent argued that
once the industrial union has obtained an exclusive contract on a
plant-wide basis, either by organizing before the advent of the craft
union or by capturing the craft union's majority in a later election,
thereafter the craft employees are irrevocably part of the industrial
unit. The effect is, therefore, to crystalize the industrial form of
organization and prevent the craft employees from ever thereafter
changing their minds .°
In the cases immediately following American Can, its impact was some-
what lessened.° In General Elec. Co.,1° the Board declared that severance
would be permitted provided that (1) the group constituted a true craft,
(2) it had maintained its identity while bargaining in the more comprehen-
3 Id., 64 L.R.R.M. at 1017.
4 "The Board shall not . . . (2) decide that any craft unit is inappropriate . . .
on the ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board determination,
unless a majority of the employees in the proposed craft group vote against separate
representation. . . ." Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(b) (2),
61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(6)(2) (1964).
5 13 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939).
6 Id. at 1256-57.
7 Id. at 1257.
8 Id. at 1260.
9 See, e.g., Bendix Aviation Corp., 39 N.L.R.B. 81 (1942).
10 58 N.L.R.B. 57 (1944). See Jones, Self-Determination vs. Stability of Labor
Relations, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 313, 316 (1960).
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sive unit, and (3) it had protested its inclusion in the broader unit or, in the
alternative, that the broader unit was established without its knowledge and
there had been no previous consideration of the merits of a separate unit. 11
As a result of this case, the requirement that craft workers bargain on a
separate basis became known as the "identity concept." Actually, under this
new doctrine, the workers' own insistence on severance was considered
crucial, and "as a result of their failure to establish that they had retained
their identity, many groups normally regarded as crafts were denied permis-
sion to sever. . . ."12
The "identity concept" was disregarded by the Board in 1946 in the
International Minerals & Chem. corp. case, in which it was said that
the circumstance that collective bargaining on a more inclusive
basis has existed for a number of years is not sufficient in itself to
deny the employees in the craft group the opportunity of deciding
... whether they desire to continue to be represented as part of the
production and maintenance unit or whether they desire to bargain
as a separate unit. This is particularly true because these employees
have never previously had an opportunity to vote on this issue. 13
One factor the Board considered, closely paralleling an important factor in
Mallinckrodt, was the necessity of balancing two opposing interests—"stabil-
ity and certainty in labor relations [favoring] . . . adherence to existing
bargaining patterns; [and] on the other hand, the cohesiveness and special
interests of a true craft group often [indicating] .. . the appropriateness
of groups limited to members of a particular craft." 14
As a result of its dissatisfaction with Board decisions in the area, Con-
gress in 1947 considered the adoption of what was to become Section 9(b) (2)
of the Taft-Hartley Act. The majority of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare wished to grant craft employees the fullest measure of
protection available. In its report, the committee observed that
since the decision in the American Can case . , where the Board
refused to permit craft units to be "carved out" from a broader
bargaining unit already established, the Board, except under un-
usual circumstances, has virtually compelled skilled artisans to
remain parts of a comprehensive plant unit. The committee regards
the application of this doctrine as inequitable. 15
As a result, the committee stated the purpose of the new subsection in the
following way:
The several amendments to this subsection propose to limit the
Board's discretion in determining the kind of unit appropriate for
collective bargaining . . . . In determining whether members of a
11 See also 11 NLRB Ann. Rep. 25 ( 1 946).
12 Krislov, Administrative Approaches to Craft Severance, 5 Lab. L.J. 231, 233
(1954).
12 71 N.L.R.B. 878, 881-82 (1946).
14 Id. at 881.
14 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Scss. 12 (1947).
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craft may be separated from a larger unit the Board may not dis-
miss a craft petition on the ground that a different unit has been
established by a prior determination. This overrules the American
Can rule. . . 16
By thus limiting the Board's discretion, in the sense that it could no longer
dismiss a craft petition simply on the basis of a prior contrary determination,
Congress was granting significantly more freedom for severance.
The House Committee on Education and Labor also voiced the need for
adequate representation of craftsmen:
The Board seems to have wished to make bargaining units as large
as it could, notwithstanding that its policy deprived large minorities
of that freedom to decline to bargain collectively that the Labor
Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act both declare to be our national
policy.... The Board has gone far in this. Although the employees
in several plants or mines may wish one union, or no union at all,
to represent them, the Board may include these employees in a
single unit with employees in other plants or mines who wish an-
other union as their representative and who, by greatly outnum-
bering them, can force upon them a bargaining agent they do not
choose....
Carrying out the national policy to assure full freedom to
workers to choose, or to refuse, to bargain collectively, as they wish,
is an important task for this Congress)?
One frequently quoted statement of the bill's intent is the remark by Senator
Taft that the bill did not give craft employees "an absolute right in every
case; it simply provides that the Board shall have discretion and shall not
bind itself by previous decision but that the subject shall always be open
for further consideration by the Board." 18 While it is arguable that Senator
Taft's statement was in contradiction to the congressional reports cited
above, it seems obvious that it is at least narrower in scope than the intent
shown in the legislative reports, for Taft only cautioned the Board not to
rely on its prior determinations.
Congress, however, did not formulate a clear policy statement in this
area. Fearing the possible effect on industry of giving craft employees a
blank check to sever from the industrial union, and yet not wanting to offend
either the craft or the industrial employees, Congress wrote section 9(b) (2)
so as to give the Board only general guidelines rather than burdensome
restrictions and tests? In addition, the practical problems of the various
industries could be better solved by the Board than by the Congress. As
stated in Mueller Brass Co. v. NLRB, "Congress recognized, in both the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947, that an appropriate bargaining unit can hardly be ascer-
16 Id. at 25.
17 H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1947).
18 93 Cong. Rec. 3836 (1947).
78 See Jones, supra note 10, at 314.
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tained by means of some neat statutory formula and, therefore, decided to
furnish only minimal standards to guide the Board." 2°
Whether or not Congress meant to give the Board discretion in this field,
the Board took it upon itself to exercise some discretion. In the cases im-
mediately following the enactment of section 9(b) (2), there was a marked
tendency to limit the opportunities for severance. This was accomplished
by placing an increased amount of weight on two factors: the prerequisites
for classification as a true craft21 and the degree of integration in the
industry. Indicative of the latter was the landmark case of National Tube
Co.22 In this case, the Board determined that its action in finding a craft
unit inappropriate could not be based on the fact that a different unit
was established by a prior Board determination. In reaching this decision,
the Board stated that the only restriction imposed by 9(b) (2) was that
neither a prior determination nor bargaining history "may ... be the sole
ground on which the Board may decide that a craft unit is inappropriate
without an election." 2a National Tube revealed the Board's uncertainty as to
exactly how far Congress had gone in overruling the American Can doctrine.
While the Board concluded that the legislative history disclosed some intent
to overrule American Can, it also felt that at other points Congress seemed
only to intend that prior Board determinations be eliminated from considera-
tion.24 The Board argued that since Senator Taft spoke of the 9(b) (2)
rule only in terms of prior Board determination—and indeed since these
were the very words used in the statute—that
the American Can doctrine cannot be considered synonymous with
the phrase "prior Board determination," [and] . . . the legislative
history preceding the enactment of Section 9(b) (2) does not ade-
quately establish a certain Congressional intent to eliminate the use
of bargaining history by a particular employer as a controlling
factor in determining the issue of separate craft representation. 25
In addition, the Board felt that any consideration of the legislative history of
the act was entirely unnecessary, since
the statute clearly states that the Board's action in finding a craft
unit inappropriate shall not be based on the fact that a different
unit has been established by a prior Board determination. Because
the phrase "a prior Board determination" contains no substantial
ambiguity, and because Section 9(b) (2) is a proviso, as distin-
guished from an affirmative statement of duties imposed by the
statute, we believe that we should not strain to give this proviso an
interpretation unwarranted by its express language. 2 °
On the facts of National Tube, the Board denied a separate unit for the
20 180 F.2d 402, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
21 See, e.g., National Container Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 770 (1948).
22 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948).
23 Id. at 1205.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Id. at 1203.
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petitioners, a group of bricklayers, because of the high degree of integration
between the bricklayers and the unskilled workers in the production unit.
This integration was held to preclude severance, and the decision was to
weigh heavily against craft unions in highly complex industries. 27 Studies
in the field, however, have shown ample reason to question the argument
that severance would tend significantly to disrupt manufacturing efficiency
in a highly integrated industry. 28
In addition to restricting the opportunity for severance through its
"integration" theory, the Board imposed other restrictions on severance in
subsequent cases. For example, the group claiming severance had to be
essentially homogeneous. The workers had to be primarily skilled and could
not frequently work interchangeably at skilled and unskilled jobs.29 Further-
more, workers seeking craft-union representation had to possess skills which
required substantial training."
In 1954, the Board limited its policy towards highly integrated indus-
tries. In American Potash & Chem. Corp., 31 the Board stated that if the
workers seeking severance constituted a true craft, and if the union seeking
to represent them was a traditional representative of that type of worker,
the craft group should be afforded the opportunity to decide for itself the
issue of separate representation. The Board's ruling, however, did not ex-
tend to the so-called National Tube industries, because the Board did not
wish to disrupt an established bargaining relation." The Board stated, how-
ever, that the National Tube decision would not be further extended in that
it "permanently [forecloses] . . . the possibility of establishing . . . craft
units in an entire industry by freezing that industry into an industrial unit
for bargaining purposes." 33 The Board admitted that "a small cohesive
craft group, by striking, closes down a large industrial plant employing
thousands of workers," but it also felt that "to deny crafts separate repre-
sentation [is] ... no less productive of labor unrest." 34
Following the American Potash decision, the Board further liberalized
its attitude towards severance. In Beaunit Mills, Inc.," although the em-
ployer did not recognize or designate any of his employees as journeymen
27 See, e.g., Permanente Metals Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 804 (1950) (aluminum industry);
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1949) (lumber industry); Corn Prods.
Ref. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 187 (1949) (wet milling industry). These industries became
known as the National Tube industries.
28 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 10.
29 E.g., Borden Corp., 83 N.L.R.B. 765 (1949); Monsanto Chem. Co., 78 N.L.R.B.
1249 (1948); George S. Mepham Corp., 78 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1948); Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 78 'N.L.R.B. 478 (1948) ; Caterpillar Tractor Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 457 (1.948);
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 41 (1944). •
ao Mathieson Ala. Chem. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 1079 (1952) ; Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 719 (1948); American Mfg. Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 647 (1948).
31 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
32 But see NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1959),
in which the court rejected the exclusion of the National Tube industries from the
craft-union rule.
33 107 N.L.R.B. at 1240.
84 Id. at 1422.
35 109 N.L.R.B. 651 (1954).
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and maintained no apprentice system, severance was allowed on the basis
that the workers possessed the "range of skills and perform[ed] the duties of
journeymen in [the pipefitters] . . . craft." 36 In addition, the requirement
that the petitioning union be a traditional representative of the type of
workers seeking severance was strained in Friden Calculating Mach. Co.,37
where severance was allowed although the petitioning union had only recently
been formed. The Board argued that it could be determined whether a union
is a craft union by examining its history. However, "a union newly organized
for the sole and exclusive purpose of representing members of that craft .
can be as much a craft union as an older organization which has been repre-
senting craft members for many years."'"
The Board at this point had gone full circle in its attitude towards
severance. Beginning with its reliance on bargaining history in American
Can, it had moved toward a policy of protecting highly integrated indus-
tries from severance, because it felt that craft workers could, by their
separate representation, paralyze entire industries through strike action. The
latter doctrine, proclaimed in National Tube, had been severely limited by
American Potash, which rejected the stress placed on integration and favored
craft severance through a new test. This test simply required a true craft and
a union which had traditionally represented this type of worker, factors
easily met by most petitioners.
With this fluctuating set of standards behind them, the Board in the
instant case attempted to strike a mean. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works" re-
jected the American Potash test as too mechanical in "confining consideration
solely to the interests favoring severance, [and precluding] . . . the Board
from discharging its statutory responsibility to make its unit determination
on the basis of all relevant factors, including those factors which weigh
against severance."'"
However, the Board did not revert to a National Tube doctrine in which
a single factor would be fatal to severance, but contemplated a weighing of
considerations, listing the following as examples:
1. Whether or not the proposed unit consists of a distinct and
homogeneous group of skilled journeymen craftsmen performing
the functions of their craft on a nonrepetitive basis, or of employees
constituting a functionally distinct department, working in trades
or occupations for which a tradition of separate representation
exists.
2. The history of collective bargaining of the employees sought
and at the plant involved, and at other plants of the employer,
with emphasis on whether the existing patterns of bargaining are
productive of stability in labor relations, and whether such stability
will be unduly disrupted by the destruction of the existing patterns
of representation.
30 Id. at 656.
37 HO N.L.R.B. 1618 (1954).
38 Id. at 1619.
39 162 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 64 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966).
so Id, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1016.
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3. The extent to which the employees in the proposed unit have
established and maintained their separate identity during the period
of inclusion in a broader unit, and the extent of their participation
or lack of participation in the establishment and maintenance of the
existing pattern of representation and the prior opportunities, if
any, afforded them to obtain separate representation.
4. The history and pattern of collective bargaining in the industry
involved.
5. The degree of integration of the employer's production pro-
cesses, including the extent to which the continued normal operation
of the production processes is dependent upon the performance of
the assigned functions of the employees in the proposed unit.
6. The qualifications of the union seeking to "carve out" a separate
unit, including that union's experience in representing employees
like those involved in the severance action.'"
The factors listed by the Board are not novel in the sense that no prior
Board had considered them. Indeed, each individually had played a role
in the decisions discussed above. The true significance of Mallinckrodt there-
fore lies not in the consideration of any of the factors individually but
in their collective weight as important elements in determining whether
severance should be granted. The presence of one factor should no longer
preclude severance; instead, a decision will be reached only after a balancing
of many factors.
In Mallinckrodt the Board refused to grant severance for several reasons.
There was no showing that the craft's interests had been neglected by their
bargaining representative, there had been a lack of concern for maintaining
and preserving a separate group identity for bargaining purposes, and the
petitioner had not traditionally represented the craft. On the basis of these
considerations, the Board felt that the interest in maintaining stability in
the existing bargaining unit outweighed the interests served by affording the
twelve instrument mechanics the opportunity to change their bargaining
representative.
In a companion case, E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,42 the Board
agreed to grant severance to a group of electricians despite the fact that their
work was intimately related to the successful operation of the employer's
production process. In addition to finding that the electricians possessed the
skills of true craftsmen and enjoyed a separate community of interest, the
Board definitely stated its determination not to extend the National Tube
doctrine of denying severance in highly integrated industries solely on the
basis of such integration. In its decision, the Board stated what is, in effect,
the basic distinction between the National Tube and Mallinckrodt doctrines.
Whereas National Tube regarded a highly integrated production process as a
block to severance, Mallinckrodt established that a consideration of integra-
tion is merely one factor in deciding whether severance will be permitted:
Integration of a manufacturing process is a factor to be considered
41 Ibid.
42 162 N.LR.B. No. 49, 64 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1966).
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in unit determinations. But it is not in and of itself sufficient to
preclude the formation of a separate craft bargaining unit, unless
it results in such a fusion of functions, skills, and working condi-
tions between those in the asserted craft group and others outside
it as to obliterate any meaningful lines of separate craft identity. 43
In Holmberg, Inc.," a second companion case, the Board professed to
follow the Mallinckrodt theory of considering all relevant factors, and arrived
at a decision denying severance to a group of tool and die makers because of
the overlap in skilled and unskilled work performed by the craft workers,
their substantial community of interest with other employees in the existing
unit, and a successful twenty-four-year bargaining history. While ostensibly
following Mallinckrodt, the Board's statement that it had considered all
relevant factors seems rather shallow if one examines the two major points
on which it based its decision. In stating that there was significant overlap
in skilled and nonskilled work, the Board failed to consider the fact that
up to eighty per cent of the craftsmen's time was spent in skilled labor, and
that the occasional use of tool and die workers in an unskilled capacity was
intended primarily to forestall the necessity of laying off the latter. It is
also questionable that the craft workers shared a community of interest with
the unskilled workers simply because they used common locker room and
cafeteria facilities, since the tool and die makers received substantially
greater wages and contract benefits. The Board may have been greatly im-
pressed by the twenty-four-year bargaining history in the plant, which sub-
stantially benefited the craft workers. This factor alone, however, or even
considered jointly with the overlap of work and community of interest, seems
insufficient to deny severance under Mallinckrodt.
On the basis of Mallinckrodt and its two companion cases, it is not
certain in what direction the Board is now turning. While a consideration of
all relevant factors, as propounded in Mallinckrodt, seems to have been
followed in Du Pont, Holmberg looks at these factors in a rather narrow
light—straining to find elements that would justify a denial of severance.
under Mallinckrodt. It is commendable that the Board consider many factors,
but the whole purpose of section 9(b) (2 ) could nevertheless be defeated by
too narrow an application of any one of them. It would seem more in line
with congressional intent to give "greater power to the craft units to organize
separately,"45
 and to consider all relevant factors, weighing those favoring
severance against those discouraging it, in arriving at a justifiable decision.
If each consideration is valued so highly that failure to meet it results in a
denial of severance, the legislation would clearly be frustrated.
It is submitted, therefore, that the true test of Mallinckrodt lies in its
interpretation by future Boards. Only by refusing to limit itself to a defini-
tive set of factors can the Board provide for a sufficient degree of flexibility
in each case to meet the changing and intricate conditions in the various
industries.
RICHARD K. COLE
43 Id., 64 L.R.R.M. at 1024.
44 162 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 64 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1966).
45 93 Cong. Rec. 3836 (1947).
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